Institutsseminar/2021-10-15 Zusatztermin
| Datum | Freitag, 15. Oktober 2021 | |
|---|---|---|
| Uhrzeit | 14:00 – 15:00 Uhr (Dauer: 60 min) | |
| Ort | ||
| Webkonferenz | https://sdqweb.ipd.kit.edu/wiki/Institutsseminar/Microsoft Teams | |
| Vorheriger Termin | Mo 11. Oktober 2021 | |
| Nächster Termin | Fr 22. Oktober 2021 |
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Vorträge
| Vortragende(r) | Oliver Liu |
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| Titel | Design Space Evaluation for Confidentiality under Architectural Uncertainty |
| Vortragstyp | Bachelorarbeit |
| Betreuer(in) | Sebastian Hahner |
| Vortragssprache | |
| Vortragsmodus | |
| Kurzfassung | In the early stages of developing a software architecture, many properties of the final system are yet unknown, or difficult to determine. There may be multiple viable architectures, but uncertainty about which architecture performs the best. Software architects can use Design Space Exploration to evaluate quality properties of architecture candidates to find the optimal solution.
Design Space Exploration can be a resource intensive process. An architecture candidate may feature certain properties which disqualify it from consideration as an optimal candidate, regardless of its quality metrics. An example for this would be confidentiality violations in data flows introduced by certain components or combinations of components in the architecture. If these properties can be identified early, quality evaluation can be skipped and the candidate discarded, saving resources. Currently, analyses for identifying such properties are performed disjunct from the design space exploration process. Optimal candidates are determined first, and analyses are then applied to singular architecture candidates. Our approach augments the PerOpteryx design space exploration pipeline with an additional architecture candidate filter stage, which allows existing generic candidate analyses to be integrated into the DSE process. This enables automatic execution of analyses on architecture candidates during DSE, and early discarding of unwanted candidates before quality evaluation takes place. We use our filter stage to perform data flow confidentiality analyses on architecture candidates, and further provide a set of example analyses that can be used with the filter. We evaluate our approach by running PerOpteryx on case studies with our filter enabled. Our results indicate that the filter stage works as expected, able to analyze architecture candidates and skip quality evaluation for unwanted candidates. |
| Vortragende(r) | Johannes Häring |
|---|---|
| Titel | Enabling the Information Transfer between Architecture and Source Code for Security Analysis |
| Vortragstyp | Bachelorarbeit |
| Betreuer(in) | Frederik Reiche |
| Vortragssprache | |
| Vortragsmodus | |
| Kurzfassung | Many software systems have to be designed and developed in a way that specific security requirements are guaranteed. Security can be specified on different views of the software system that contain different kinds of information about the software system. Therefore, a security analysis on one view must assume security properties of other views. A security analysis on another view can be used to verify these assumptions. We provide an approach for enabling the information transfer between a static architecture analysis and a static, lattice-based source code analysis. This approach can be used to reduce the assumptions in a component-based architecture model. In this approach, requirements under which information can be transferred between the two security analyses are provided. We consider the architecture and source code security analysis as black boxes. Therefore, the information transfer between the security analyses is based on a megamodel consisting of the architecture model, the source code model, and the source code analysis results. The feasibility of this approach is evaluated in a case study using Java Object-sensitive ANAlysis and Confidentiality4CBSE. The evaluation shows that information can be transferred between an architecture and a source code analysis. The information transfer reveals new security violations which are not found using only one security analysis. |
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